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FINANCIAL CONTROLS AND COUNTER-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS 
OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
Nikos Passas 
This paper focuses on financial controls and vigilance against the 
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). It refers to the new 
Financial Action task Force (FATF) Recommendations on this subject and 
outlines relevant provisions of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions    
(UNSCRs) and the considerable challenges facing the international     
community in their implementation. While it suggests that there is a good 
deal of work underway towards consistent and effective implementation, it 
points to some concrete measures and areas where counter-proliferation 
finance efforts could focus, particularly in the area of commerce and trade. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Neither the use of financial sanctions as a tool to apply pressure on 
governments nor controversies and diverse interpretations of their effects 
are new. An early example from classical Greece is the Megarian Decree, 
under which Athens introduced a trade embargo on Megara merchants   
during the Pericles era.1 Aristophanes,2 Thucydides3 and others4 offered 
  
  Nikos Passas is a Professor at Northeastern University. His law degree is from the Uni-
versity of Athens, his Master’s from the University of Paris II, and his Ph.D. from the Uni-
versity of Edinburgh. He is a member of the Athens Bar. Passas is fluent in six languages and 
specializes in the study of corruption, terrorism, money laundering, illicit flows, informal 
fund transfers, white-collar crime, targeted sanctions, organized crime and international 
crimes. He has more than 140 publications in thirteen languages. Passas offers public and 
private sector training, serves as an expert witness and consults with law firms, financial 
institutions, international organizations and government agencies on all continents. He serves 
as the Editor-in-Chief of Crime, Law and Social Change: An International Journal, and as an 
associate editor in several others. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Interna-
tional Society of Criminology. 
 1 Carl A. Alex, Updating Economic Operations in the Post Industrial Age (March 1998) 
(unpublished Master of Science in Defense Analysis thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA343821.  
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very different views: some suggested that it was effective, while Thucydides 
regarded it as a pretext for the war that followed. 
The U.N. first introduced sanctions in the 1920s, but it employed 
them seldom in the years that followed. It was the 1990s that witnessed a 
significant growth in the use of such coercive measures.5 Aimed at global 
security threats in ways that could be effective but less radical than the use 
of force,6 their scope has widened, ranging from aggression and conflict to 
international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD).7 Multilateral sanctions have been considered and applied due to 
proliferation concerns in several countries,8 but the most recent ones focus 
on non-state actors, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic     
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).9 Originally, counter-proliferation 
measures revolved chiefly around export controls, but these are now      
supplemented by financial control requirements for both governmental and 
private sector actors. 
At the same time, “follow-the-money” approaches to crime control 
have been applied at both the national and international levels.10 Financial 
  
 2 ARISTOPHANES, THE ACHARNIANS (S. Douglas Olson ed., 2002). 
 3 THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (Richard Crawley trans., 1903). 
 4 Jona Lendering, Megarian Decree, LIVIUS.ORG, http://www.livius.org/mea-mem 
/megara/decree.html (last updated Mar. 31, 2006); James McDonald, Supplementing Thycyd-
ideds’ Account of the Megarian Decree, 2 ELECTRONIC ANTIQUITY, no. 3 1994, http://scholar. 
lib.vt.edu/ejournals/ElAnt/V2N3/mcdonald.html. 
 5 ENRICO CARISCH & LORAINE RICKARD-MARTIN, GLOBAL THREATS AND THE ROLE OF 
UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS 2 (2011); see also GEORGE A. LOPEZ & DAVID CORTRIGHT, THE 
SANCTIONS DECADE: ASSESSING UN STRATEGIES IN THE 1990S (2000). 
 6 See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED (3d ed. 2007); 
PETER WALLENSTEEN & CARINA STAIBANO,  INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: BETWEEN WORDS 
AND WARS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM (2005). 
 7 CARISCH & RICKARD-MARTIN, supra note 5, at 3. 
 8 See BERNARD SITT ET AL.,  SANCTIONS AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 28 (2010) (noting that suspected WMD-producing states such as 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Syria and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are 
among the states targeted by WMD-related sanctions).  
 9 NIKOS PASSAS, IAN ANTHONY, GENEVIEVE DEANAZ & JANET WALKER, PREVENTION OF 
CBRN ILLICIT TRAFFICKING AND DECEPTIVE FINANCIAL PRACTICES: REPORT TO THE 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2010).  
 10 This has been marked by differing degrees of success and heated debates among ob-
servers, such as JEFF BREINHOLT, TAXING TERRORISM FROM AL CAPONE TO AL QAIDA: 
FIGHTING VIOLENCE THROUGH FINANCIAL REGULATION 1 (2005) (discussing the importance 
of follow the money methods as counterterrorism strategy); Nikos Passas, Terrorism Financ-
ing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas, in TERRORISM FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 21–38 (Jeanne K. Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas eds., 2007)  
(arguing for a better balance of the costs and benefits of certain “follow the money” strate-
gies); PETER REUTER & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, CHASING DIRTY MONEY 73 (2004) (suggesting 
that technological developments promote follow the money methods); Michael Levi & Peter 
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controls have been increasingly employed to address serious crime and  
security problems ranging from organized criminal group activities to    
corruption and the support of terrorism. These can be used for investigative 
and intelligence-gathering objectives—they assist in identifying                
co-conspirators, facilitators, and supporters—as well as for deterrence,   
disruption, punishment and confiscation purposes. The most recent addition 
to the list of unlawful practices targeted with this approach is the financing 
of WMD proliferation. In February 2012, the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF), a body setting international standards on money laundering and 
terrorism finance, revised its Recommendations and incorporated the issue 
of proliferation finance.11 New Recommendation 7 is entitled “Targeted 
financial sanctions related to proliferation” and states that: 
Countries should implement targeted financial sanctions to comply with 
United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to the prevention, 
suppression and disruption of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and its financing. These resolutions require countries to freeze without   
delay the funds or other assets of, and to ensure that no funds and other  
assets are made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of, any 
person or entity designated by, or under the authority of, the United       
Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations.
12
 
There is no legal and universally adopted definition of               
“proliferation finance.” However, the FATF’s working definition can be 
used for our purposes here: 
Proliferation finance refers to the act of providing funds or financial     
services which are used, in whole or in part, for the manufacture,           
acquisition, possession, development, export, trans-shipment, brokering, 
transport, transfer, stockpiling or use of nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons and their means of delivery and related materials (including both 
technologies and dual use goods used for non-legitimate purposes), in  
  
Reuter, Money Laundering, 34 CRIME & JUST. 289, 294 (2006) (“[T]he [anti-money launder-
ing] regime does facilitate investigation and prosecution of some criminal participants who 
would otherwise evade justice, but fewer than expected and hoped for by advocates of ‘fol-
low the money’ methods.”); R.T. NAYLOR, SATANIC PURSES: MONEY, MYTH, AND 
MISINFORMATION IN THE WAR ON TERROR (criticizing measures imposed by the Patriot Act to 
facilitate follow the money strategies) (2008), and J.C. SHARMAN, THE MONEY LAUNDRY: 
REGULATING CRIMINAL FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 71 (2011) (arguing that the ability 
to obscure transactions defeats follow the money efforts).  
 11 See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF], INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON 
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND PROLIFERATION: 
THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS 47 (2012) (noting the new focus on proliferation financing in 
these Recommendations).  
 12 Id. at 13.  
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contravention of national laws or, where applicable, international           
obligations.
13
 
This paper focuses on proliferation finance, outlines relevant     
provisions of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) and the 
challenges facing the international community in their implementation. 
While it suggests that there is a good deal of work towards consistent and 
effective implementation, it points to some concrete measures and areas 
where counter-proliferation finance efforts could focus.14 
II. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND PROLIFERATION FINANCE  
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter provides that when the Security 
Council establishes a threat or breach of the peace or acts of aggression, it 
has the power to introduce measures ranging from “provisional measures” 
to the use of force.15 Article 41 lays down the legal basis on which sanctions 
can be applied: 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may 
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.  
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations 
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of       
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
16
 
The obligations stemming from Resolutions issued under Chapter 
VII of the U.N. Charter are generally mandatory. Yet, room for              
interpretation exists in the language of some provisions. For instance, when 
the Resolutions state that Security Council “decides” or that Member States 
“shall” do something, there is no debate about their mandatory nature. 
However, when Member States are “called upon” to take certain measures, 
  
 13 FATF, COMBATING PROLIFERATION FINANCING: A STATUS REPORT ON POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT AND CONSULTATION (2010). 
 14 The paper draws largely on work I conducted while I was privileged to be part of a 
study team that produced a report for the Commission of the European Union, titled 
PREVENTION OF CBRN ILLICIT TRAFFICKING AND DECEPTIVE FINANCIAL PRACTICES. PASSAS 
ET AL., supra note 9. 
 15 U.N. Charter arts. 39–42. 
 16 U.N. Charter art. 41. 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include com-
plete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, tele-
graphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations. 
Id. 
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some argue that these provisions are not mandatory, while others believe 
that they are mandatory nonetheless. Such diverse interpretations obviously 
affect different countries’ implementation and practices. 
The international community has reached a broad consensus on the 
need to prevent WMD proliferation, but the use of financial controls to this 
effect is novel to both government agencies and the private sector. How 
exactly the new counter-proliferation tools can be integrated with or       
supplement more traditional controls is not entirely clear—even in countries 
strongly supportive of the new measures.  
It is important to clarify what sort of measures are provided for by 
the various UNSCRs. The UNSCRs most relevant to a review of financial 
vigilance measures are: 
 1540, 1673, 1810, 1887, 1977 on non-state actor proliferation;  
 1695, 1718, 1874 on DPRK; and  
 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1929 on Iran. 
These Resolutions establish Committees and occasionally Expert 
Groups in order to support and monitor their implementation. Their 
measures cover not only export- and border-control issues, but also: 
 financial controls and vigilance; 
 activity-based financial prohibitions; 
 specific vigilance measures and actions on designated banks; 
 freezing of assets; 
 international cooperation and information sharing; and 
 financial and technical assistance. 
Resolution 1540 requires that States refrain from supporting by any 
means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing,        
possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or         
biological weapons and their delivery systems.17 The Resolution obliges 
States to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery, including by 
establishing appropriate controls over related materials.18 
It also mandates that States: 
[A]dopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any       
non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport,   
transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of 
delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage 
  
 17 S.C. Res. 1540, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004). 
 18 Id. ¶ 3. 
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in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice,   
assist or finance them.
19
 
Subsequently, the Security Council stressed the need for work     
under this and successor Resolutions to be coordinated with that of     
Committees operating under counter-terrorism Resolutions. Thus, UNSCR 
1810 urged the enhanced cooperation “between the 1540 Committee, the 
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), 
concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban, and the Security Council Committee 
established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) . . . .”20 
With respect to Iran, UNSCR 1737 (2006) and subsequent          
Resolutions, the Security Council has adopted measures that include: 
 An embargo on providing to Iran proliferation-sensitive nuclear and 
ballistic missile-related items listed in the main text or in    annexes;
21
 
 A ban on the procurement of any arms and related materiel from Iran 
and a ban on the supply of seven categories of conventional weapons 
and related materiel to Iran;
22
 
 A travel ban and an assets freeze on specific persons and entities listed 
in annexes. This assets freeze also applies to any individuals or entities 
acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, the designated persons and 
entities, and to entities owned or controlled by them.
23
 
The UNSCR financial measures regarding Iran are more specific 
than those relative to non-state actors. Some are broad-based and preventive 
in nature, but they contain specific and targeted sanctions as well. They also 
refer to obligations of both governments and financial institutions. 
UNSCR 1737 contains several financial measures. Among other 
things, it requires that all States: 
[S]hall . . . take the necessary measures to prevent the provision to Iran of 
any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment,    
brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or ser-
vices, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the     
prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified [in 
paragraphs 3 and 4].
24
 
It further mandates that all States: 
  
 19 Id. ¶ 2.  
 20 S.C. Res. 1810, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1810 (Apr. 25, 2008). 
 21 S.C. Res. 1737, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006).  
 22 S.C. Res. 1747, ¶¶ 5–6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007).  
 23 S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 21, ¶¶ 10, 12.  
 24 Id. ¶ 6.  
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[S]hall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources 
which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this resolution or at 
any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities 
designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons or entities 
designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as being engaged 
in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation 
sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery 
systems, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their            
direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, including through  
illicit means . . . .
25
 
UNSCR 1803 introduced provisions that applied the measures of 
Paragraph 12 of UNSCR 1737 to expanded lists of persons and entities and 
increasingly called for vigilance over all trade and finance—as well as   
financial institutions—to prevent any support to Iran’s nuclear proliferation 
activities.26 It also focused on financial institutions and two specific Iranian 
banks by: 
Call[ing] upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of         
financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in 
particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and their branches and    
subsidiaries abroad, in order to avoid such activities contributing to the 
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear 
weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006).
27
 
UNSCR 1929 expanded the measures and extended some to        
explicitly cover insurance and re-insurance.28 Additional measures applied 
to financial institutions as UNSCR 1929 called upon States to: 
[T]ake appropriate measures that prohibit financial institutions within their 
territories or under their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or 
subsidiaries or banking accounts in Iran if they have information that   
provides reasonable grounds to believe that such financial services could 
contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the          
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
29
 
With respect to DPRK, UNSCRs 1695 (2006) and especially 1718 
(2006) and 1874 (2009) introduced a regime intended to force DPRK to 
comply with demands related to its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. 
The measures in this regime include: 
  
 25 Id. ¶ 12. 
 26 See S.C. Res. 1803, ¶¶ 9–10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008). 
 27 Id. ¶ 10. 
 28 See S.C. Res. 1929, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June. 9, 2010). 
 29 Id.  ¶ 24. 
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 An embargo on the supply of nuclear, ballistic missiles and other 
weapons of mass destruction program-related items listed in UNSC 
documents;
30
 
 A complete arms embargo with the exception of small arms and light 
weapons and their related materiel, which can be supplied using con-
trolled channels and after prior notification to the Security Council;
31
 
 Individual targeted sanctions in the form of a travel ban and an assets 
freeze on designated persons and entities;
32
 and 
 A ban on the export of luxury goods to the North Korea.33 
UNSCR 1718 mandated a freeze of: 
[F]unds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their 
territories at the date of the adoption of this resolution or at any time  
thereafter, that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the     
persons or entities designated by the Committee or by the Security Council 
as being engaged in or providing support for, including through other      
illicit means, DPRK's nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-
related and ballistic missile related programmes, or by persons or entities 
acting on their behalf or at their direction, and ensure that any funds,       
financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made 
available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their      
territories, to or for the benefit of such persons or entities.
34
 
Extending further previous sanctions, UNSCR 1874 called upon 
Member States: 
[T]o prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, 
or from their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized    
under their laws (including branches abroad), or persons or financial       
institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources 
that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-
related, or other weapons of mass destruction-related programs or           
activities, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources 
on their territories or that hereafter come within their territories, or that are 
subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their         
jurisdiction, that are associated with such programs or activities and      
  
 30 S.C. Res. 1718, ¶ 8(a)(ii), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006). 
 31 S.C. Res. 1874, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009). 
 32 S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 30, ¶¶ 8 (d) & (e). 
 33 See Security Council Imposes Sanctions on DPR Korea After its Claimed Nuclear Test, 
UN NEWS CENTRE (Oct. 14, 2006), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20261 
&Cr=DPRK&Cr1 (“Also prohibited from export to the DPRK are luxury goods.”). 
 34 S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 30, ¶ 8(d). 
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applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions in            
accordance with their national authorities and legislation.
35
 
UNSCR 1874 also called upon: 
[A]ll Member States and international financial and credit institutions not 
to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, or         
concessional loans to the DPRK, except for humanitarian and                 
developmental purposes directly addressing the needs of the civilian    
population, or the promotion of denuclearization, and also calls upon 
States to exercise enhanced vigilance with a view to reducing current 
commitments.
36
  
In practical terms, implementing such measures may require new 
domestic legislation; the introduction of preventive measures and monitor-
ing; enhanced enforcement capacity; and actions to be taken by private-
sector entities, especially financial institutions.  
Two categories of measures can be usefully distinguished in these 
provisions. One category includes targeted financial sanctions centered on 
actors of concern, while the other is based on activities that support        
proliferation efforts or programs. 
Targeted financial sanctions generally “entail the use of financial 
instruments and institutions to apply coercive pressure on transgressing  
parties—government officials, elites who support them, members of non-
governmental entities—in an effort to change or restrict their behavior.”37 
This type of measure can thus target specific persons or entities, their assets, 
and their transactions because of their involvement in proliferation         
activities. Occasionally, the names of targets are cited in the main text of 
Resolutions.38 More often, however, the list of targeted actors is appended. 
For example, UNSCR 1737 Paragraph 5’s provisions on asset 
freezes cited earlier should be applied to any other persons or entities     
“engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s       
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear 
weapon delivery systems, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or 
at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, including 
through illicit means . . . .”39 It also required that all States “shall ensure that 
any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being 
  
 35 S.C. Res. 1874, supra note 31, ¶ 18. 
 36 Id. ¶ 19.  
 37 WATSON INST. FOR INT’L STUDIES, TARGETED FINANCIAL SANCTIONS: A MANUAL FOR 
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION, at ix (2001). 
 38 See S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 28, ¶¶ 8, 10 (discussing measures to restrict the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), or those acting on their behalf or at their direction). 
 39 S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 21, ¶ 12. 
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made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their 
territories, to or for the benefit of these persons and entities.”40 The         
provisions cited above regarding specific Iranian banks and entities of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines also fall in this category. An     
example from the DPRK regime is provided by Paragraph 8(d) of UNSCR 
1718 as cited above. 
On the other hand, activity-based measures relate to specific actions 
and transactions, such as financing or insurance, linked to proliferation  
efforts. For example, UNSCR 1540 requires states to establish “appropriate 
laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export 
and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and 
trans-shipment such as financing . . . .”41 According to UNSCR 1540,     
financial controls should be available for application to any exports of    
controlled items, regardless of destination.42 How and when these legal  
instruments are applied is left to the discretion and best judgment of the 
national authorities in the exporting state concerned.  
There are also provisions that require countries to apply activity-
related controls against particular countries, such as Iran and DPRK. An 
illustration of this type are the measures of Paragraph 6 of UNSCR 1737 
regarding technical assistance or training, financial assistance, etc., related 
to the prohibited items specified in that resolution.43 More recently, UNSCR 
1929 mandates that States “prevent the provision to Iran by their nationals 
or from or through their territories of technical training, financial resources 
or services, advice, other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, 
transfer, provision, manufacture, maintenance or use” of specified          
conventional arms and related materiel.44 In such cases, the Security Council 
targets financial, commercial and service flows connected to activities   
supportive of programs of concern in these countries while allowing other 
transactions with these countries that are not subject to restrictions.  
The exhaustive listing of requirements and obligations of U.N. 
Member States is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is clear that they 
vary not only by type of measure, but also by the particular targets, the   
implementing national authorities, and the responsibilities of individuals 
and private sector entities. 
  
 40 Id. 
 41 S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 17, ¶ 3(d). 
 42 Id. 
 43 S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 21, ¶ 6.  
 44 S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 28, ¶ 8. 
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III. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES  
A review of Member State reports to the various U.N. Security 
Council sanctions committees on what they have done to implement the 
Resolutions discussed here reveals a wide variety of approaches with     
respect to financial vigilance. Many States refer to their money laundering, 
terrorism or terrorism-finance laws as measures responsive to the UNSCRs. 
Other States simply notify national authorities of the UNSCRs’ passage. A 
small number of governments have considered or introduced specific new 
measures and laws. France, for instance, has passed a law with three      
separate offenses against the finance of proliferation of nuclear, chemical, 
and biological weapons.45 On the other extreme, some countries have not 
even filed a required progress report to the relevant committees.46 
This global asymmetry of national laws against proliferation         
finance is matched by the asymmetry in the existence, strength and         
application of national export controls. While there is no systematic and 
comprehensive review of these diverse laws and practices, it is crystal clear 
that there is plenty of room for improving the way the global community 
addresses proliferation threats. 
The challenges are legion. We have already noted the lack of a  
universal definition of the term “proliferation finance” and the uncertainty 
about which obligations stemming from the different UNSCRs are        
mandatory, even when they are under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. This 
uncertainty is of course not coincidental, as it indicates the diverse interests, 
priorities, and objectives of the members of the Security Council.          
Consensus has not been reached even within the group of the five perma-
nent members of the Security Council. The ambiguity of terms, such as  
“financial services,” “other services,” “Iranian-controlled bank,”            
“reasonable grounds to believe,” and “entity under control,”—which are 
neither defined nor operationalized—makes it unclear what concrete steps 
are required.47 
  
 45 See Loi 2011-266 du 14 mars 2011 relative à la lutte contre la prolifération des armes de 
destruction massive et de leurs vecteurs [Law 2011-266 of March 14, 2011 on the Fight 
Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery], Journal Offi-
ciel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 15, 2011, p. 4577, 
arts. 2, 5, 11, available at http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT 
000023707202&categorieLien=id.  
 46 See Cole J. Harvey, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Slow, but Steady Progress 
Implementing UNSCR 1540, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (July 20, 2011), http://www.nti. 
org/analysis/articles/unscr-1540/ (noting that only 59 states met the deadline to submit na-
tional implementation reports six months following the passage of Resolution 1540).  
 47 The FATF has issued three helpful sets of non-binding guidance.  See generally FATF, 
GUIDANCE REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FINANCIAL PROVISIONS OF UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS TO COUNTER THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION, Annex (June 29, 2007), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/23/16 
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A complicating factor for both government bodies and financial   
institutions is the existence of related sanction regimes and financial       
controls at the regional and national level, notably by the EU48 and the 
U.S.49 These controls go beyond the requirements of the Security Council, 
have extra-territorial implications, and have been the subject of frequent 
additions and amendments, reflecting geo-political developments and     
perceptions of proliferation risks. 
Beyond legal uncertainties, other implementation difficulties range 
from lack of capacity and awareness, political will, commercial concerns, 
and lack of coordination to the neglect of guidance and outreach to the   
private sector.50 One particular issue worth dwelling upon is the issue of 
proliferators’ increased sophistication in recent years and the connection 
between proliferators and other crime or security concerns. 
Proliferating networks appear to be involving multiple production 
facilities, more countries, intermediaries, and trans-shipment points, all 
while compartmentalizing operations and occasionally breaking             
procurement down to parts and small amounts, which are difficult to detect 
or trace. As the FATF notes, “while proliferators previously attempted to 
buy or sell whole manufactured systems with the effective control systems, 
there is a growing trend to purchase or sell more elementary components. 
Proliferation networks continuously seek out and exploit weaknesses in the 
global export control system and international financial system.”51 
Moreover, rising trade volumes coupled with technological         
advances have led to more complex trading patterns, rendering export    
controls more difficult to manage and maintain. In the area of WMD    
components, the same FATF report has noted the difficulty in dealing with 
“dual-use” goods with both commercial applications and applications for 
WMD.52 By masking WMD-related procurement activities as legitimate 
trade, proliferators tend to exploit global commerce by operating in and 
  
/39318680.pdf; FATF, PROLIFERATION FINANCING REPORT (June 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/14/21/41146580.pdf; FATF, BEST PRACTICES PAPER: 
SHARING AMONG DOMESTIC COMPETENT AUTHORITIES INFORMATION RELATED TO THE 
FINANCING OF PROLIFERATION (Feb. 2012), available at  http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/5/ 
31/49848736.pdf (explaining the terms in more context). 
 48 Consolidated List of Persons, Groups, and Entities Subject to EU Financial Sanctions, 
EU: EXTERNAL ACTION, http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/consol-list_en.htm (last updated 
May 4, 2012).  
 49 See Sections Programs and County Information, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www. 
treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 
2012) (listing the OFAC sanctions programs). 
 50 See PASSAS ET AL., supra note 9. 
 51 PROLIFERATION FINANCING REPORT, supra note 47, at 3. 
 52 See id. at 6. 
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through countries with high volumes of cross-border trade or free-trade 
zones, where their illicit shipments may escape close scrutiny. 
Even though we lack perfect knowledge of the social organization 
of proliferation networks and their interface with organized criminal groups 
or public officials, there is information to suggest that they resort to      
nominees, front companies, informal channels and methods employed in the 
commission of other offences (e.g., Customs, commercial and subsidy 
frauds, tax evasion, corruption, trade-based money laundering, etc.).  
The open-source literature has not yet discussed proliferation        
finance in detail. Indeed, this topic may be neglected even within           
governments and international organizations. Typically, agencies and   
countries do not share such information, which has hampered some study 
efforts. Yet we do know that financial institutions’ suspicious activity    
reports have triggered some such cases.53 We also know that financial  
transaction information has served well intelligence gathering, investigative, 
and prosecutorial efforts in various countries.54 Quite often, investigations 
and prosecutions were initiated under laws targeting money laundering, 
fraud or corruption. 
As proliferators seek to circumvent sanctions and other measures, 
their open-account, nominee, compartmentalized and deceptive practices 
become harder for financial institutions and government agencies to detect. 
Additionally, as efforts focus on the financial sector, proliferators may make 
more use of informal financial and trade networks, which are misunderstood 
in many parts of the world and difficult to monitor.55 Quite extensive      
informal financial, remittance, and trade networks operate in key areas—
such as South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, the Caribbean and South 
America—have been connecting jurisdictions of concern and neighboring 
countries. 
Whether or not sanction regimes and financial controls are         
successful in producing the intended outcomes, they generate effects and 
raise the cost of proliferation efforts. Past experiences show that among the 
unintended consequences of sanctions is a certain criminalization of both 
  
 53 See PASSAS ET AL., supra note 9. 
 54 See CATHERINE COLLINS & DOUGLAS FRANTZ, FALLOUT: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA'S 
SECRET WAR ON NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING 126 (2011); GORDON CORERA SHOPPING FOR BOMBS: 
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, GLOBAL INSECURITY, AND THE RISE AND FALL OF THE A.Q. KHAN 
NETWORK 166 (2006); see also CATHERINE COLLINS & DOUGLAS FRANTZ, THE NUCLEAR 
JIHADIST: THE TRUE STORY OF THE MAN WHO SOLD THE WORLD'S MOST DANGEROUS 
SECRETS…AND HOW WE COULD HAVE STOPPED HIM (2007). 
 55 See Nikos Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems, Terrorism and Money Laundering 
16, 96–97, 100 (2003) (report to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and Financial Crimes 
Action Network (FINCEN)), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208301. 
pdf (discussing that informal systems and trade facilitated transfer need to be monitored and 
should be kept in line with FATF recommendations). 
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public- and private-sector actors in target and neighboring countries through 
which illegal flows are routed.56 Criminal infrastructures, methods,        
networks, and associations brought about by the demand for prohibited 
goods and services survive sanctions regimes and pose a longer-term     
governance threats. 
Confronting such threats necessitates the consideration of five key 
points emerging from research into financial crime and specifically relevant 
to money laundering, terrorism finance and corruption that are common to 
proliferation finance. These five key points consist of the need for:            
(1) evidence-based policy making; (2) practices that transcend the current 
fragmentation of controls that focus on particular offenses; and                  
(3) a strategic approach that (4) includes outreach and partnership with the 
private sector as well as the academic community and (5) ensures that data 
on the global flows of information, commerce and finance are collected, 
rendered traceable, analyzed, and matched in order to identify irregular and 
suspicious activities, to piece together the bigger picture of serious financial 
misconduct and networks, illuminating the economic activity currently  
taking place in the shadows. 
Briefly, here are the main issues from each point:  
1) Too much crime control and policy has been based on              
assumptions, suspicions and theories rather than carefully collected and 
strong evidence about the problem at hand.57 As with terrorism finance, we 
must gather the facts and understand well proliferation activities and      
networks, their division of labor and methods of operation.  
2) Unusual activities that raise suspicion and initial investigations 
will often not flag a particular underlying offense. The details about the 
motives and aims of the offenders emerge gradually as inquiries progress. 
The same applies to sanctions violations and proliferation efforts. Firewalls 
and strict division of labor that discourage or prevent sharing of information 
among different control agencies undermine the fight against serious crime 
and security threats.  
3) Given the plethora of challenges facing the implementation of a 
counter-proliferation finance regime, success and effectiveness is a long-
term goal that can be reached progressively and systematically. The project 
is complex, sensitive and in need of consensual knowledge and a thoughtful 
sequencing of immediate steps and medium term objectives, while         
anticipating and minimizing as much as possible adverse consequences.  
  
 56 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 44–48 (2007). 
 57 Cynthia Lum & Leslie W. Kennedy, Evidence-Based Counterterrorism Policy, in 
SPRINGER SERIES ON EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME POLICY 3, 3–8 (Cynthia Lum & Leslie W. Ken-
nedy eds., 2012) (stating that crime policy ought to be based on scientific studies and on 
valid empirical data analysis).  
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4) The best ideas and sustainable solutions can only be achieved 
through multi-stakeholder interactions and collaborations. Guidance from 
government agencies help private sector entities and compliance officers 
better identify irregular and problematic accounts, clients or transactions 
and report them to appropriate authorities, such as the Financial Intelligence 
Units. Better quality and targeted reporting assists investigations and      
intelligence analysis as it often provides information otherwise unavailable 
to government agencies. Risk-based approaches can only be done           
effectively, when the risks are properly identified, understood and          
prioritized. Academic and research institutions can assist in this effort by 
creating new technologies enhancing controls and by engaging in           
systematic, comprehensive and critical analysis of data and evidence      
contributing to improved rule-making, policy construction, planning,     
facilitating multi-stakeholder interactions and training.  
5) Research has shown that significant numbers of abuses, irregular 
and suspicious commercial activities involving billions of U.S. dollars in 
value every year go undetected due to lack of transparency, traceability and 
analysis of these transactions on their own and in comparison with the fi-
nancial data that relate to them. This is a major vulnerability undermining 
all financial controls the global community has been implementing over the 
years.58 As Passas and Flynn point out:  
The fundamental challenge that remains to be faced head on is how the 
global flows of information/intelligence, finance, trade and services can be 
made traceable and analyzed at the same time, in the same place. This is 
the only way one can piece together the puzzle so as to reveal a compre-
hensive picture of how criminal global networks are able to move and 
benefit from billions of dollars of profits generated from illicit activities.
59
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Proliferation of WMD is a top priority security concern, and         
financial controls are a recent and necessary addition to the international 
community’s toolkit. The policy implications of the challenges discussed in 
this paper can be a rather lengthy report per se. The urgent needs include 
clearer UNSCR mandates, guidance to implementers, and analysis of the 
relationship correspondence between them and regional or national sanction 
  
 58 See Nikos Passas, Setting Global CFT Standards: A Critique and Suggestions, 9 J. 
MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 281(2006); Nikos Passas, Terrorist Finance, Informal Mar-
kets, Trade and Regulation: Challenges of Evidence in International Efforts, in SPRINGER 
SERIES ON EVIDENCE-BASED CRIME POLICY 255 (Cynthia Lum & Leslie W. Kennedy eds., 
2011). 
 59 See Nikos Passas & Stephen Flynn, Overcoming the Mexican Trade Facilitated Money 
Laundering Challenge (this paper is to be presented at the Southwest Border Anti-Money 
Laundering Alliance, June 13–14, 2012, in Scottsdale, Arizona) (on file with author). 
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regimes. One helpful precedent to consider is the approach taken by the 
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, which published legislative guides for the 
implementation of recent and complex international conventions against 
transnational organized crime and against corruption.60 The task there was 
to explain what is necessary for effective implementation without           
interpreting the conventions. This took painstaking effort to negotiate and 
reach consensus on their language and requirements, while giving examples 
of implementation in different legal traditions. Given the sensitivity around 
proliferation finance issues and controls, an equivalent initiative on       
UNSCRs would be welcome by Member States and the private sector. The 
FATF’s forthcoming methodology for the assessment of compliance with its 
new 40 Recommendations could possibly pave the ground for more       
harmonized approaches too. 
The study of proliferation cases and the mapping of proliferation 
networks, their operations, and their nexus with conventional, informal, and 
illegal actors is a necessary step towards the construction of an evidence-
based strategy in cooperation with the private sector as well as academia. 
An important issue raised above is the need to rethink crime control 
beyond specific offenses and defenses against them. The same methods, 
routes, and infrastructures can be used for a whole range of crimes:        
offenders most often do not specialize in one crime. Crime controls,       
especially for serious security threats, must be better organized and        
coordinated. Financial controls are sometimes resisted as an unnecessary 
distraction from border and expert controls. Increasingly, they are seen as 
very useful supplements to all kinds of serious crime. Ideally, they do not 
just supplement other controls but they all get integrated, which is arguably 
the only way in which national, regional, and international efforts will be 
truly effective. 
Awareness-raising, training- and capacity-building, gaming         
exercises, technical assistance to countries and international bodies, further 
elaborations and operationalization of the risk-based approach to tackling 
financial crimes, expert panels, and committees are all important actions 
and recommendations. Nevertheless, the critical objective in this global 
effort is to appreciate that counter-proliferation and serious crime control is 
one and the same enterprise. If we adequately control proliferation, we will 
control financial and other crime. If we effectively control serious crime in 
general, we will also detect, capture, and disrupt proliferation attempts. In 
  
 60 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME DIVISION FOR TREATY AFFAIRS, LEGISLATIVE GUIDES 
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL 
ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE PROTOCOLS THERETO, U.N. Sales No. E.0000000 (2004); U.N. 
OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME DIVISION FOR TREATY AFFAIRS, LEGISLATIVE GUIDES FOR THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION, U.N. Sales 
No. E.06.V.16 (2006). 
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order to accomplish this, we must address the challenge of the three global 
flows: commercial, financial and informational. Research and policy      
energies and brainpower ought to be invested in the quite-feasible61 task of 
collecting and analyzing the data; rendering them traceable; matching them; 
producing investigative leads; building the “big picture” of crime and     
security threats; and leading to pragmatic, sustainable strategies. 
  
 61 An initiative in exactly this direction is currently underway at Northeastern University 
as a collaboration between the Kostas Institute for Research in Homeland Security, the 
School of Criminology and Criminal Justice and the College of Computer Sciences. 
